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BEFORE AND AFTER UNITED STATES V. RELIABLE
TRANSFER: AN ANALYSIS OF MARITIME COLLISION
LAW
Irene Johnson Barnes*
She was a big one, and she was coming in a hurry, too, looking like
a black cloud with rows of glow-worms around it; but all of a
sudden she bulged out, big and scary, with a long row of wide-open
furnace doors shining like red-hot teeth, and her monstrous bows
and guards hanging right over us. There was a yell at us, and a
jingling of bells to stop the engines, a powow of cussing, and whis-
tling of steam-and as Jim went overboard on one side and I on
the other, she came smashing straight through the raft.t
Mark Twain
Introduction
From its inception, the law governing vessels on navigable
waters has tended to accommodate itself to the particular problems
that stem from the nature of ships and the needs of the maritime
world. Accordingly, the standards of conduct that determine land-
based negligence are often revised or held inapplicable to negligence
on the water. Fundamental rules of law apply to colliding ships
where there is a possibility that fault exists. Since the determination
of negligence in collisions has, in the United States, been closely tied
to the rule that damages must be equally divided where there is
mutual fault, it is necessary to examine the history of damages in
collisions to understand the changes occasioned by the Supreme
Court's adoption of comparative negligence.
1. Fundamentals of Collision Law
a. Standard of Care
When a collision occurs on navigable waters, liability is predi-
cated upon a finding of fault.1 It is often determined that a vessel is
at fault when it can be shown that it was in violation of one of the
applicable rules of navigation which have been developed to ensure
safe and orderly traffic on the seas. Originally, the navigation rules
* Associate with the Little Rock law firm of McMath, Leatherman & Woods; B.A.,
Hendrix College, 1972; J.D., University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law, 1976.
t M. Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn 94 (8th printing 1953).
1. G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 72 (2d ed. 1975). See The Java, 81
U.S. (14 Wall.) 189 (1871).
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were found in the customs and practices of seamen, and it was
necessary to establish the existence of a generally accepted rule
before showing its applicability to the particular circumstances of
the case under consideration.' It was not until 1854 that the first
unofficial code of regulations was compiled by the London Trinity
House.3 Despite the code's unofficial status, violation of one of these
rules, while not conclusive on the issue of negligence, could be intro-
duced as evidence of lack of due care.' However, as the shipping
industry became more complex, it was apparent that an unofficial
code and a body of custom were insufficient to meet the needs of
modern navigation.'
Accordingly, England adopted a comprehensive set of statutory
rules in 1862,6 and the United States followed suit two years later.7
In the United States there has been a gradual expansion and devel-
opment of these rules so that currently there are four sets that apply
to different classes of waters within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
American courts. The first of these, the International Rules, govern
only United States ships on the high seas, but they are identical to
rules that have been enacted by other maritime nations.' The other
three sets of rules control navigation on the inland waters of the
United States and include the Great Lake Rules,9 the Western Riv-
ers Rules, 0 and the Inland Rules." Among the most important of
these statutes are those that specify the lights and shapes that a
vessel is required to display for identification purposes, 2 the steer-
ing and sailing rules which instruct a vessel on the proper procedure
when there is a possibility of a collision, 13 and the fog rules which
2. Mattioni, Incidents of Maritime Collision Law, 37 Temp. L.Q. 456, 457 (1964).
3. Id. The London Trinity House was the English pilotage and navigational authority.
See also R. Marsden, Collisions at Sea (9th ed. 1934).
4. Mattioni, supra note 2, at 458.
5. Id.
6. Merchant Shipping Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 63, § 25.
7. Act of Apr. 29, 1864, 13 Stat. 58.
8. 33 U.S.C. 88 1051-1094 (1970). These Rules include for the first time provisions
dealing with radar. See Bockrath, The Law of Radar Navigation-Ahead Slow, 23 La. B.J.
65 (1975); Healy, Radar and the New Collision Regulations, 37 Tul. L. Rev. 621 (1963).
9. 33 U.S.C. §§ 241-295 (1970).
10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 301-356 (1970). These Rules apply to the Mississippi River, its tribu-
taries, the Atchafalaya River, and the Red River of the North.
11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 151-232 (1970). The Inland Rules apply to all other navigable waters,
including harbors and the Intracoastal Waterway. See also Comment, Bargeowner Beware:
The Expansion of Liability of Barges for Maritime Collisions, 19 Loy. L. Rev. 449 (1973).
12. See Bradshaw v. The Virginia, 176 F.2d 526 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 892
(1949); The Titan, 23 F. 413 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885); The William J. Riddle, 102 F. Supp. 884
(S.D.N.Y. 1952)(towage lights). See also G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 78.
13. The steering and sailing rules provide that, in a given situation, one vessel is bur-
dened while the other is privileged. The burdened ship is required to take action to avoid the
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contain special provisions for signalling and navigating in the fog.'4
Unlike other statutes the Rules of Navigation are not couched
in legal terms of art. They are explicit, detailed instructions ad-
dressed to ships' officers, who are required to comply with them.'5
The rules are mandatory and strictly and literally construed by the
courts. 6
In addition to the statutory Rules of Navigation, there are other
federal, state, and local statutes and regulations that may have a
bearing on a particular situation if they do not contradict federal
law. Thus, the Pilot Rules issued by the Coast Guard contain more
detailed provisions than the statutes, and when they are not in
conflict with statutory law, they have the effect of statutes. Addi-
tionally, local custom is followed where well established and not in
conflict with statutory or regulatory procedure. Where statutory
rules are silent or leave vacant interstices, the requirements of good
seamanship and due care establish the standard of due care.7
b. The Pennsylvania Rule
Proximate causation is an issue in collision cases. However, the
traditional requirements of causation that exist in other areas of tort
law have been held to be insufficient in maritime collision cases.
Where there has been a violation of the Rules of Navigation before
a collision, the vessel in violation must prove not only that the
violation did not contribute to the collision, but that it could not
have contributed to it.8 The rule takes its name from the case in
which it first appeared, The Pennsylvaniaj9 and was designed to
collision, while the privileged ship maintains her speed and course. Accordingly, a steam
vessel -must stay clear of a sailing vessel, which is less easily maneuvered. See Postal S.S.
Corp. v. El Isleo, 308 U.S. 378 (1940); The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459 (1896); The Britannia, 153
U.S. 130 (1894); Hertz Consolidated Fisheries, 213 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1954); G. Gilmore & C.
Black, supra note 1, § 7-9.
14. See Union Oil Co. v. The San Jacinto, 409 U.S. 140 (1972); The Umbrig, 166 U.S.
404 (1897); The Martello, 153 U.S. 64 (1894); Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. v. United States,
222 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1955).
15. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-3.
16. See The Albert Dumois, 177 U.S. 240 (1899); Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1898);
Farwell's Rules of the Nautical Road 198 (4th ed. A. Prunski 1971). Rule 27 lends some
flexibility to the Rules in providing that safety may require a departure from a specific rule.
"In obeying and construing [these rules] due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation
and collision, and to any special circumstances . . . which may render a departure from
[these rules] necessary . . . to avoid immediate danger." 33 U.S.C. § 1089 (1970).
17. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-3.
18. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873); G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note
1, § 7-5.
19. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
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encourage safe travel on the seas by penalizing any departure from
the Rules of Navigation."
The United States Supreme Court in The Pennsylvania" dealt
with a collision between two ships on the high seas during a heavy
fog. While the Pennsylvania was proceeding too fast, the other boat,
the Mary Troop, was ringing a bell instead of sounding a foghorn
as required by the statute. In holding that both ships were responsi-
ble for the collision the court stated,
The liability for damages is upon the ship. whose fault caused
the injury. But when, as in this case, a ship at the time of a
collision is in actual violation of a statutory rule intended to pre-
vent collisions, it is no more than a reasonable presumption that
the fault, if not the sole cause, was at least a contributory cause of
the disaster. In such a case the burden rests upon the ship of
showing not merely that her fault might not have been one of the
causes, or that it probably was not, but that it could not have
been.
22
The party attempting to invoke the Pennsylvania Rule must
first establish the negligence of the ship that has violated a statute.23
Then the Pennsylvania Rule will shift the burden of proving causa-
tion to the statutory violator who must produce evidence sufficient
to overcome the presumption that the violation was the cause of the
collision.24 In recent years there seems to have been a relaxation by
some courts of the Pennsylvania standard. It has been suggested
that the lack of causal relationship between the violation and the
loss must only be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,2 5 and that the
presumption does not demand proof by the violator that "its fault
could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have a causal connec-
tion to the collision, no matter how speculative, improbable or re-
mote."12
20. Pierro v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 186 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1950) (penalty aspect of
the Pennsylvania Rule discussed); The Princess Sophia, 61 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1932), cert.
denied, 288 U.S. 604 (1933). "This burden ... is frequently extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible, for the violator to discharge, in the nature of things; and therein lies the true penalty
imposed upon him." Id. at 347. See also Note, The Pennsylvania Rule: Charting a New
Course for an Ancient Mariner, 54 B.U.L. Rev. 78 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ancient
Mariner].
21. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
22. Id. at 136.
23. Ancient Mariner, supra note 20, at 88. See also Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126
N.E. 814 (1920)..
24. Lie v. San Francisco & Portland S.S. Co., 243 U.S. 291 (1917); The Victory and The
Plymothian, 168 U.S. 410 (1897); Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893); The Blue Jacket, 144
U.S. 371 (1892); The Dexter, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 69 (1874).
25. Ancient Mariner, supra note 20, at 90.
26. Seaboard Tug & Barge, Inc., v. Rederi AB/Disa, 213 F.2d 772, 775 (1954).
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Technically the Pennsylvania Rule only applies where there has
been a statutory violation. For a ship at fault in some other regard,
negligence is determined by the usual standards of causation. 7
While the situations which the rule covers would seem to be easily
defined, problems have arisen as to whether a rule is statutory or
not. Particularly, questions have been posed by Rule 29 of the Inter-
national Rules of Navigation which provides that:
Nothing in [these rules] shall exonerate any vessel, ... from the
consequences of any neglect to carry lights or signals, or of any
neglect to keep a proper look-out, or of the neglect of any precau-
tion which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or
by the special circumstances of the case.28
It is arguable that Rule 29 is a statutory requirement of due care
that may result in the characterization of all negligence as a statu-
tory fault." With regard to the more specific provisions of the Rule,
the courts have been sharply divided in their interpretation. While
the Second and Fifth Circuits have held that the failure to keep a
proper lookout is a statutory fault,30 the Fourth Circuit has con-
cluded that the purpose of the Rule was not to make an addition to
the statutory Rules of Navigation but to make sure that compliance
with the Rules would not excuse a vessel's failure to meet the stan-
dards of good seamanship that exist independently of statute."
Although the task of overcoming the Pennsylvania Rule may
seem to be insurmountable, it has on occasion been accomplished,
significantly where the party invoking the rule has been grossly at
fault. In National Bulk Carriers, Inc., v. United States2 the Rutgers
Victory had a statutory duty to stay out of the way of the Nashbulk.
When the vessels were a half mile apart the master of the Nashbulk,
concerned because the Rutgers Victory was not changing her course,
shifted three points to starboard without giving the whistle signal
required by the International Rules of Navigation. A minute before
the collision he blew the danger signal, but it was too late to avoid
the other ship. The Rutgers Victory, who had no lookout or watch
officer, contended that had the whistle been blown before the
27. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873). See also G. Gilmore & C. Black,
supra note 1, § 7-11.
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1091 (1970).
29. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-5.
30. The Tempest v. United States, 404 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1968); Dwyer Oil Transp.
Corp. v. The Edna M. Matton, 255 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1958).
31. Anthony v. International Paper Co., 289 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1968).
32. 183 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1951). See, e.g., Pennsyl-
vania R.R. v. Steamship Marie Leonhardt, 202 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Pa. 1901).
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change in course, her crew might have been alerted. Rejecting this
argument, the court held that the requirement of the change in
course signal was not merely to alert another ship and that to hold
otherwise would in effect be putting a premium on the gross negli-
gence of the Rutgers Victory." A similar result has been reached
where a drilling platform's lights could only be seen 4.4 miles rather
than the five miles required by the Coast Guard Regulations. In that
case it was held that the colliding vessel, which was equipped with
radar, should have discovered the platform even if it had no lights."
Where it has been determined that the statutory fault was not
causally connected to the collision, the courts have achieved results
similar to those reached through application of the major-minor
fault doctrine. 5 With application of either rule, the harshness of the
divided damages rule has been avoided where the fault of one vessel
is disproportionately greater .
3
c. In Extremis
Despite the requirement that the Rules of Navigation be
strictly complied with, there is one situation where a vessel in viola-
tion of a rule will not be held accountable. There will be no liability
when a vessel, through no fault of its own, is in danger of an immi-
nent collision and, in response to the danger, violates the rules or
standards of good seamanship7.3 Under these circumstances a suc-
cessful defense of in extremis will relieve the ship from liability
entirely. The defense was first outlined in The Bywell Castle.3 8 The
Princess Alice and the Bywell Castle were on a parallel course until
the Princess Alice came across the bows of the Bywell Castle at a
distance of 100 to 400 yards. The Bywell Castle then made a
"wrong" maneuver. In relieving the Bywell Castle of liability, the
court stated,
33. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., v. United States, 183 F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir. 1950).
34. Continental Oil Co. v. Glenville, 210 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1962).
35. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-5. See also Ancient Mariner, supra note
20, at 88.
36. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., v. United States, 183 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1950) (L.
Hand, C.J., dissenting).
37. Where a vessel is faced with an emergency not of her own creation, she need not
act with the standard of care required in a normal situation. While contributory negligence
reduces the damages in admiralty, in extremis will relieve the ship from liability entirely.
Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 Cornell L.Q. 333, 352 (1932). See,
e.g., The Stifinder, 275 F. 271 (2d Cir. 1921)(overruled on other grounds by American Tobacco
Co. v. The Katingo Hadjipatera, 211 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1954)); The Blue Jacket, 144 U.S. 371
(1892); The Nacoochee, 137 U.S. 330 (1890).
38. [1878] 4 P.D. 219 (C.A.).
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[A] ship has no right, by its own misconduct, to put another ship
into a situation of extreme peril, and then charge that other ship
with misconduct. . . . [If in that moment of extreme peril and
difficulty, such other ship happens to do something wrong, so as
to be a contributory to the mischief, that would not render her
liable for the damage, inasmuch as perfect presence of mind, ac-
curate judgment, and promptitude under all circumstances are not
to be expected.
39
An assertion of in extremis can only be made by a vessel that
did not originally contribute to the dangerous situation. 0 To claim
the defense, it is necessary that the danger be imminent and that
the faulty maneuver be closely connected in time to the emer-
gency." Whether the time that has elapsed between the wrong ma-
neuver and the danger is too long is determined on a case by case
basis. 2 Further, a vessel that is aware of a danger and waits too long
to act will not be able to avail itself of the defense.
3
The determination of whether a sufficient danger exists to in-
voke in extremis must also be determined on a case by case basis.
The defense has been equated with the concept of "emergency" and
shares some of its imprecision." It has been suggested that a certain
amount of vagueness is essential if unwarranted strictness on the
basis of hindsight is to avoided. 5
d. Inscrutable Fault and Inevitable Accident
In addition to in extremis, there are two other defenses which
will relieve a vessel of responsibility for loss resulting from a colli-
sion. The first of these defenses is known as inscrutable fault." A
case of inscrutable fault exists when the nature of the occurrence is
39. Id. at 223.
40. Wilson v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 276 U.S. 454 (1928); Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
41. City of Paris, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 634 (1869). See H. Baer, Admiralty Law of the
Supreme Court § 9-4 (2d ed. 1969).
42. See, e.g., United States v. M/V Wuerttemberg, 330 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1964).
43. Id.
44. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-3 at 491. Arkansas has adopted the
following definition of emergency:
A person who is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with danger to himself or
others not caused by his own negligence is not required to use the same judgment
that is required of him in calmer and more deliberate moments. He is required to
use only the care that a reasonably careful person would use in the same situation.
Arkansas Model Jury Instructions, Civil 2d, 614 (1974). See Johnson v. Nelson, 242 Ark. 10,
411 S.W.2d 661 (1967).
45. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-3 at 491 n.38.
46. Id. § 7-2; The Grace Girdler, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 196 (1868).
[Vol. 1
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clear but the court is unable to decide exactly what act or omission
constituted fault.47 Where liability is predicated upon fault, as it is
in collision cases, it must follow that where proof of fault fails, there
can be no allocation of blame.48 While an early series of American
cases required that the damages be divided where there was inscru-
table fault," it now appears to be settled that each party must bear
its own loss.5 Because the Rules of Navigation are comprehensive
and because one party is often aided by a presumption of fault, it
is a relatively rare case that will be decided on the basis of inscruta-
ble fault.1 Usually a court is able to find a violation of the rules and
determine fault accordingly.
The second situation in which no fault will be found is that of
inevitable accident. Simply put, when a collision is the result of an
act of God or occurs despite the taking of all proper precautions, the
accident is considered to be inevitable. 2 Like the defense of inscru-
table fault, the defense of inevitable accident is the obvious corol-
lary of the requirement that liability must be based upon fault.
Where due care has been exercised or an act of God has intervened,
it cannot properly be said that either party is to blame. If the de-
fense is to apply, the precautions taken to avoid a mishap must be
reasonable under the circumstances as they are known or are reason-
ably to be anticipated.53 Accordingly, where a houseboat broke loose
during Hurricane Betsy and caused damage in the area, the court
concluded that the damage was the result of an act of God, since
the houseboat had been properly secured and the storm was unu-
sually violent.5 However, on another occasion a holding of inevita-
47. The Breeze, 4 F. Cas. 52 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1872) (No. 1829). See also Staring,
Contribution and Division of Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 45 Cal. L. Rev. 304,
318 (1957).
48. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-2.
49. The Kallisto, 14 F. Cas. 95 (E.D. Va. 1877) (No. 7600); The Tracy J. Bronson, 24
F. Cas. 119 (N.D.N.Y. 1869) (No. 14,131). It has been suggested that since collisions do not
often occur without fault it is fairer to divide the damages in cases of inscrutable fault.
Staring, supra note 47, at 320.
50. The Jumna, 149 F. 171 (2d Cir. 1906); The Worthington & Davis, 19 F. 836 (E.D.
Mich. 1883); The Banner, 225 F. 433 (S.D. Ala. 1915). The Brussels Collision Convention of
1910 abolishes the rule of division in cases of inscrutable fault in article 2. For an English
translation see 6 Benedict on Admiralty 39-42 (7th ed. A. Knauth & C. Knauth 1969)
[hereinfter cited as Benedict].
51. J. Lucas, Cases on Admiralty 745 (1969).
52. See, e.g., Stainback v. Rae, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 532 (1852); Dunton v. Allan S.S. Co.,
119 F. 590 (3d Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 192 U.S. 606 (1904); The Sea King, 14 F.2d'684
(S.D.N.Y. 1926), modified on rehearing, 29 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1928).
53. Swenson v. The Argonaut, 204 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1953); Massman-Drake v. Towboat
MV Hugh C. Blaske, 289 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. La. 1968).
54. Twery v. Houseboat Jilly's Yen, 267 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Fla. 1967). A heavy burden
1978]
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ble accident was reversed when the appellate court found that a
barge that had broken loose during a hurricane should have been
moved before the arrival of the storm. 5
Inevitable accident is often regarded as an affirmative defense.
However, two commentators have claimed that in reality it is a
rebuttal of a presumption of fault." Thus, in The Rose Standish,57
where a vessel under a duty to reverse her engines could not do so
because of valve failure that occurred notwithstanding proper main-
tenance, there was a presumption of fault triggered by the failure
to reverse which shifted the burden of proof to the Rose Standish.
This presumption was rebutted by proof of careful maintenance and
evidence that the valves were inoperable. The court found that the
collision was due to inevitable accident, and each party was re-
quired to bear its own loss." Therefore, if this analysis is accepted,
the defense turns out to be nothing more than the inability of either
party to sustain its burden of proving the other's fault."
2. Damages
a. History
Inextricably tied to a determination of liability and an applica-
tion of rules is the concept of divided damages that existed in the
United States until 1975. This approach was taken as early as the
eleventh century in the Rolls of Oleron 0 While the concept of negli-
gence had not been clearly developed at that time, Article 15 of the
Rolls of Oleron provided that damages should be halved when a ship
coming from the high seas collided with a ship at anchor and the
is placed on a vessel to show that the breaking loose of a vessel is the result of inevitable
accident. General Pub. Warehouse Co. v. Queen Line, Ltd., 177 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
55. Boudoin v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 281 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1960).
56. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-2 at 487. Judge Learned Hand approached
inevitable accident in the following manner: "Strictly, it is no defense at all, but a true
presumption; that is to say, a duty laid upon him to supply proof which casts him if he fails."
Cranberry Creek Coal Co. v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 33 F.2d 272, 274 (2d Cir. 1929),
cert. denied, 280 U.S. 596 (1929). Contra, Mole & Wilson, supra note 37, at 351-52. See The
Anna C. Minch, 271 F. 192 (2d Cir. 1921).
57. 26 F.2d 480 (D. Mass. 1928). See also Giamona v. Mineo, 125 F. Supp. 354 (N.D.
Cal. 1954).
58. The Brussels Collision Convention art. 4 follows this rule. 6 Benedict, supra note
50, at 39.
59. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-2.
60. Oleron was an island off the west coast of France. The Prud'hommes of the Com-
mune had jurisdiction of maritime matters which was exercised according to the usages and
customs of merchants and mariners. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 189, 220 (1950). For a brief history of early maritime law, see H. Baer, supra
note 41, § 9-1.
[Vol. 1
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masters and mariners of the ship underway could swear that the
accident occurred without their fault or intent." In the fourteenth
century the Grand Coutumier d'Oleron went a step further in ruling
that where two ships were at anchor and one negligently broke loose
and collided with the other, the negligent ship was required to bear
the loss. 2 Based on logic and the foregoing rules, the next step was
the conclusion that the damages should be halved where both sides
were at fault. 3
While a tradition of apportioning damages based on the degree
of fault developed in the Mediterranean ports, and later in Italy and
France,64 the Rolls of Oleron and later compilations adopted the rule
of divided damages and were of primary influence in northern
France, Flanders, and the Low Countries." As early as the four-
teenth century, England recognized the Rolls as authoritative. De-
spite British acceptance of the Rolls, for nearly two hundred years
English courts awarded either full damages or none at all. 6 How-
ever, early in the seventeenth century, about the same time that the
concept of negligence came into prominence, English decisions div-
iding loss made their appearance. 7 Throughout the eighteenth cen-
tury, the admiralty courts continued to favor equal division and in
1815, in The Woodrop-Sims,6" the court in dictum delineated the
situations in which divided damages would or would not apply. Lord
Stowell defined four kinds of collisions at sea: (1) where the collision
was caused by the fault of the defendant ship; (2) where it was
caused by the fault of the plaintiff ship; (3) where it was the result
of mutual fault; (4) where it occurred without the fault of either
ship. It was said that the loss should be divided only in the third
situation, where the collision was caused by the fault of both ships."
61. Turk, supra note 60, at 221.
62. The significant judgments of the Maritime Court of Oleron were compiled in this
work in 1344 A.D. Id. n.80.
63. Id. at 221-22.
64. The Consulato del Mare, dating from 1340 and compiled by the Prud'hommes of
Barcelona, provided that damages were to be set in accordance with the opinions of the
experts. It has been suggested that this was the birth of the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence. Id. at 223.
65. The Rolls were also embodied in the Sea Laws of Wisby. Wisby was an important
commercial center on the Island of Cohland. Id. at 224.
66. Id. at 226.
67. Mole & Wilson, supra note 37, at 342.
68. 165 Eng. Rep. 1422 (1815). In an earlier case, despite the express finding that the
fault of one ship was greater than the fault of the other, damages were equally divided. The
Petersfield and The Judith Randolph, sub. nom. Widman v. Blakes, Miscell. Bundles, Ser.
III, No. 18 (1789); see Turk, supra note 60, at 227 n.21.
69. 165 Eng. Rep. 1423, 1424 (1815).
19781
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Hay v. LeNeve 0 confirmed the Woodrop-Sims dictum, holding that
where mutual fault was involved, the division should be equal and
the degree of fault was to be disregarded. In the Judicature Act of
1873 the divided damages rule became statutory." However, by the
end of the nineteenth century the leading maritime nations on the
continent had adopted proportional division or comparative negli-
gence in collision cases. This was to be the approach taken by the
Brussels Collision Convention of 1910, and in 1911 England followed
suit in the English Maritime Convention Act.
72
The history of divided damages in the United States paralleled
that of England until the latter switched to proportional division.
After the English decision of Hay v. LeNeve,7 3 the lower federal
courts tended to follow the analysis of collisions found in that case,
and they divided the damages where there was mutual fault." The
United States Supreme Court did not rule on the issue until 1855
in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson,"5 where the Court held that
"under the circumstances usually attending these disasters, we
think the rule dividing the loss the most just and equitable, and as
best tending to induce care and vigilance on both sides, in the navi-
gation."" Soon thereafter, one court remarked that divided dam-
ages was the settled rule of law.77 Further, the rule was not limited
to a collision between two ships but was extended to collisions be-
tween vessels and fixed objects, such as piers and bridges,"8 and to
damages attributable to personal injuries and loss of life arising out
of a collision." Although representatives of the United States signed
70. 2 Shaw's Rep. 395 (1824).
71. Turk, supra note 60, at 229.
72. 6 Benedict, supra note 50, at 38-39.
73. 2 Shaw's Rep. 395 (1824).
74. The Bay State, 2 F. Cas. 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1848) (No. 1148); The Scioto, 21 F. Cas.
774 (D. Maine 1847) (No. 12,508); The Rival, 20 F. Cas. 845 (D. Mass. 1846) (No. 11,867).
75. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855).
76. Id. at 177-78.
77. The Maria Martin, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 31 (1871). By the end of the nineteenth
century some lower federal courts were apportioning damages according to fault. E.g., The
Chattahoochee, 74 F..899 (1st Cir. 1896); The Victory, 68 F. 395 (4th Cir. 1895); The Mary
Ida, 20 F. 741 (S.D. Ala. 1884). In The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 15 (1890), which is not a
collision case, the Supreme Court intimated that the question of equal division was still open.
However, this intimation was never followed.
78. Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389 (1875).
79. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963). In this case a govern-
ment employee aboard a United States ship was injured in a collision between the ship he
was on and another ship. He received compensation from the government under the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act, which was his exclusive remedy against the government. He
also sued the owner of the other ship and recovered damages. In a suit between the United
States and the other ship's owner, the court divided damages, including one half of the
amount recovered by the employee.
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the Brussels Convention of 1910, the United States failed to adopt
the Convention's proposals, and divided damages continued to be
the rule in the United States until 1975.80
b. Formula
The formula for the equal division of damages was succinctly
stated in The North Star:'
[A]ccording to the general maritime law, in cases of collision
occurring by the fault of both parties, the entire damage to both
ships is added together in one common mass and equally divided
between them, and thereupon arises a liability of one party to pay
the other such sum as is necessary to equalize the burden. This is
the rule of mutual liability between the parties."2
Where more than two vessels were at fault, each was required to
bear an equal share of the total loss.83 The seeming simplicity of the
equal division was somewhat complicated where only one ship was
being sued. In The Sapphire it was contended that the court should
have inquired into the losses of the other vessel that was party to
the suit in order to compute the damages properly. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument and insisted that the decree could only
be for half the damages actually suffered and that the court could
not consider loss to a vessel that was not actually before the court."
c. Major-Minor Fault
While the divided damages rule had the advantage of being
easily applied by the courts, it often worked an unnecessary hard-
ship on a vessel that was guilty of only a minor fault in comparison
to the transgressions of the other vessel."6 Thus, in the situation
where A sustained damages of $100,000, B's losses equalled
$500,000, and there was a determination that A was 10% at fault and
80. One reason the United States did not adopt the Convention was because of opposi-
tion to its cargo provisions. H. Baer, supra note 41, § 18-9 at 414. For a discussion of the
relationship between damages and cargo, see Huger, The Proportional Damage Rule in Colli-
sions at Sea, 13 Cornell L.Q. 531 (1928); Staring, supra note 47, at 325-26; Waesche, Cargo's
Rights in Collision Cases, 45 Tul. L. Rev. 781 (1971).
81. 106 U.S. 17 (1882). For a thorough discussion of the mechanics of divided damages,
see Huger, supra note 80, at 540.
82. The North Star, 106 U.S. 17, 22 (1882).
83. The Socony No. 123, 78 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1935); The Penoles, 3 F.2d 761 (2d Cir.
1924).
84. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 51 (1874).
85. Id.
86. Healy & Koster, Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States: Proportional Fault Rule, 7
J. Mar. L. & Com. 293, 296 (1975).
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B was 90% at fault, A would nonetheless have to pay B $200,000,
leaving each party with a net loss of $300,000. To alleviate the
harshness of this result, the courts devised a method known as the
major-minor fault doctrine, which allowed them to overlook a minor
error when the other vessel had been grossly negligent. This limita-
tion on the divided damages rule was first outlined by the Supreme
Court in The City of New York,87 which involved a collision on a
foggy night between a bark and a steamship. Not only was the
steamship going too fast, but also she failed to take the proper
precautions when the proximity of the sailing vessel became known
to her. Although she heard the foghorn of the bark, she did not slow
down; neither did she stop or reverse until the sound was located.
In relieving the bark of liability the Court stated,
Where fault on the part of one vessel is established by uncontrad-
icted testimony, and such fault is, of itself, sufficient to account
for the disaster, it is not enough for such vessel to raise a doubt
with regard to the management of the other vessel. There is some
presumption at least adverse to its claim, and any reasonable
doubt with regard to the propriety of the conduct of such other
vessel should be resolved in its favor.
88
Since the burden of proof is on each vessel to establish the fault
of the other,"8 where fault of one is inexcusable, the evidence needed
to prove the fault of the other must be clear and convincing if a case
for division is to be made." Generally the major-minor fault doc-
trine has been expressed in one of three ways: (1) doubt will be
resolved in favor of minor offenders; (2) slight fault is held not to
be a contributing factor; (3) slight fault is totally disregarded.8
Clearly, the concept of major-minor fault provided some relief
from the automatic division of damages where any fault could be
shown. Nonetheless, it was often criticized as "vague and unrelia-
ble" by those who favored proportional division.2 Too often, the
divided damages rule was applied when the fault of one vessel was
87. 147 U.S. 72 (1893).
88. Id. at 85. See also The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186 (1895).
89. The Victory and The Plymothian, 168 U.S. 410, 423 (1897). See also H. Baer, supra
note 41, § 9-3 at 223.
90. The Victory and The Plymothian, 168 U.S. 410, 423 (1897).
91. J. Griffin, The American Law of Collisions 505 (1949).
92. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-4; see United States v. Reliable Transfer
Co., 421 U.S. 397, 406 (1975)(remanded for allocation of proportional damages); Tidewater
Associated Oil Co. v. The Syosset, 203 F.2d 264, 269 (3d Cir. 1953)(equal division of damages).
It has also been intimated that damages will not be divided where one vessel could be charged
with willful fault. Sturgis v. Clough, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 451 (1859).
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out of all proportion to that of the other . 3 No real guidelines could
be devised for determining when a given situation was covered by
the doctrine, and, of course, its application was almost totally dis-
cretionary. The question was also raised as to the fairness of requir-
ing a vessel primarily responsible for the collision to shoulder all the
responsibility when the other vessel had contributed to the colli-
sion.94
The twentieth century saw an ever-increasing barrage of criti-
cism leveled at the divided damages rule. The most obvious com-
plaint was that it was inherently unfair to hold vessels that were at
fault in differing degrees equally responsible for damages. Indeed,
the rule could be said to be equitable only in comparison to using
contributory negligence as a complete bar. 5 While the rule contin-
ued to be applied in the federal courts, it was applied reluctantly.98
Judge Learned Hand described the major-minor fault doctrine as a
"sop to Cerberus"97 and in review of the facts before him stated, "An
equal division [of damages] in this case would be plainly unjust;
they ought to be divided in some such proportion as five to one. And
so they could be but for our obstinate cleaving to the ancient rule
which has been abrogated by nearly all civilized nations." ' s
The rule was also attacked on the grounds that it encouraged
transoceanic forum shopping, since the United States was the only
major maritime nation that did not adhere to the Brussels Collision
Convention of 1910, providing for apportionment of damages based
upon degree of fault.99 The result could vary dramatically depending
on the forum. Thus, in a collision between Ships A and B, where
Ship A was damaged $100,000 and estimated to be 80% at fault and
93. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 406 (1975); see Tank Barge
Hygrade, Inc., v. The Gatco New Jersey, 250 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1957).
94. Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 214 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954); Eastern
S.S. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 189 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1951); The Margaret, 30 F.2d
923 (3d Cir. 1929); see Allbritton, Division of Damages in Admiralty-A Rising Tide of
Confusion, 2 J. Mar. L. & Com. 323 (1971). Of particular significance is the critique of divided
damages presented by G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-20. The Supreme Court in
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975), accepted much of their criticism.
95. Allbritton, supra note 94, at 328; see United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421
U.S. 397, 405 (1975) (citing G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-20 at 528).
96. Adams v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 237 F.2d 884, 887 (2d Cir. 1956).
97. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., v. United States, 183 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1950).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-20 at 529; Huger, supra note 80,
at 532; Mole & Wilson, supra note 37, at 346; Staring, supra note 47, at 338. Where a collision
occurred in Dutch waters and a United States citizen invoked the jurisdiction of a federal
district court, it was held that the suit would not be dismissed, despite the fact that litigation
was already proceeding in Holland. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Lloyd Brasiliero Patrimonio Nacional,
85 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
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Ship B was damaged $50,000 and estimated to be 20% at fault, Ship
B's liability to Ship A would be $25,000 in the United States. How-
ever, in a Collision Convention country Ship A would only be liable
for $20,000.o0
d. Proportionate Allocation According to Fault
In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co. 10, the Supreme Court
indicated that it believed the criticism of the divided damages rule
to be well founded and finally determined that proportional division
of loss should be applied to maritime collision cases. The Mary A.
Whalen, a coastal tanker, had run aground on the sand, in part
because it maneuvered improperly and in part because the Coast
Guard had failed to maintain a breakwater light. The district court
apportioned damages, attributing 25% of the fault to the Coast
Guard and 75% to the Whalen. The court of appeals reversed on the
basis that it was bound by precedent requiring divided damages.'0
Examining the policy considerations underlying the divided
damages rule, the Supreme Court agreed with the rationale enunci-
ated in The Schooner Catharine0 3 but concluded that a comparative
negligence rule would have encouraged safe navigation as well as
equal division. 4 The Court also noted that the United States was
virtually alone in its refusal to follow the comparative negligence
provisions of the Brussels Collision Convention, a situation that had
increased international forum shopping. 105
The Court's primary objection to the divided damages rule,
however, was the inequitable result often achieved through its ap-
plication, a result that was as inequitable as the use of contributory
negligence to bar liability completely.106 Rejecting the suggestion
that comparative negligence was too complex for application, the
Court pointed out that experiences of other maritime nations and
the history of maritime personal injury suits indicated that the de-
termination of degrees of negligence would not be prohibitively diffi-
cult. 10,7
100. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-20 at 529.
101. 421 U.S. 397 (1975). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1972 to reconsider
the question of divided damages, but the issue was not reached as one vessel was held solely
at fault. Union Oil Co. v. The San Jacinto, 409 U.S. 140, 141 (1972).
102. Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1036, 1038 (2d Cir. 1974).
103. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 178 (1855).
104. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975).
105. Id. at 404.
106. Id. at 405.
107. Id. at 407. See also Mole & Wilson, supra note 37, at 349-50.
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Furthermore, the Court refused to wait for Congressional ac-
tion, justifying its break with precedent by pointing out that it had
traditionally led in the formulation of maritime remedies.08 The
Reliable holding is in language strikingly similar to the comparative
negligence provisions of the Brussels Collision Convention:0 9
We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their
fault to cause property damage in a maritime collision or strand-
ing, liability for such damage is to be allocated among the parties
proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault, and that
liability for such damages is to be allocated equally only when the
parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to
measure the comparative degree of their fault."10
While the opinion makes it clear that damages are to be appor-
tioned according to degree of fault, several problems are raised by
its language. Specifically the Court held that damages are to be
apportioned when "the parties have contributed by their fault to
cause property damage.""' A literal reading of this sentence would
indicate that apportionment is limited to property damage and may
not apply to damages due to loss of life or personal injury. However,
since the Court had previously extended the divided damages rule
to cases of personal injury and death,"' it would not be unreasonable
to surmise that comparative negligence will now also determine the
amount of those damages. Indeed, one lower federal court has al-
ready apportioned personal injury damages, finding no insurmount-
able barrier in Reliable or in the history of maritime damages in the
United States to such extension."' This approach is essential to the
108. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975). The Court stated,
"Congress has largely left to this court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules
of admiralty law." Id. (citing Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 347 U.S. 16, 20 (1963),
in which the Court created a general maritime wrongful death remedy).
109. Article 4 of the Brussels Collision Convention reads as follows:
If two or more vessels are in fault the liability of each vessel shall be in proportion
to the degree of the faults respectively committed. Provided that if, having regard
to the circumstances, it is not possible to establish the degree of the respective
faults, or if it appears that the faults are equal, the liability shall be apportioned
equally.
6 Benedict, supra note 50, at 39.
110. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975).
111. Id.
112. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 600 (1963); Halcyon Lines
v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 284 (1952).
113. Guidry v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 398 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. La. 1975). The court
stated, "Where two vessels collide due to the fault of both, it is established admiralty doctrine
that the mutual wrongdoers shall share equally the damages sustained by each as well as
personal injury and property damage inflicted on innocent third parties." Id. at 961 (quoting
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 284 (1952)).
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development of a uniform system for determining damages in mari-
time collision cases.
The second problem raised by Reliable is the extent to which
the Court intended to adopt the Brussels Collision Convention's
comparative negligence provisions. The Court refers to the conven-
tion in connection with forum shopping, noting that England and
nearly all other major maritime nations adhere to its provisions.,"
The similarity between the language in the opinion and that of the
Brussels Convention is also significant, particularly considering
that the Court went beyond the facts presented to it in so holding.
In Reliable there was no question of equal fault or inability to mea-
sure comparative degrees of fault fairly. ",5 Yet the Court adopted the
rule of the Brussels Convention that, in such cases, the damages are
to be equally divided." 6 It is also of interest to note that the Court
decided to abandon equal division of damages in a case that would
not be covered by the Brussels Convention, since the convention
only applies to collisions between vessels,"7 and Reliable involved
property damage arising out of a stranding."' Since the Court ap-
parently went out of its way to bring United States maritime law
into compliance with the Brussels Convention, piecemeal judicial
adoption of other Convention provisions may be forthcoming.
e. Collision Law After Reliable Transfer
Now that damages in collision cases are determined through
comparative negligence, what will be the fate of those rules of law
that existed under a divided damages system?"9 Clearly, the major-
minor fault doctrine will not be needed under comparative negli-
gence, as it was specifically designed to alleviate the injustices of the
divided damages rule.'2 The incompatibility of major-minor fault
114. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 403 (1975).
115. Id. at 411.
116. Id. The relevant language from article 4 is quoted in note 109 supra.
117. 6 Benedict, supra note 50, at 37. The Brussels Collision Convention is an
"International Convention for the unification of certain rules to govern the liability of vessels
when collisions occur between them .... " Id. (emphasis added).
118. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 399 (1975).
119. Note, Admiralty: Comparative Negligence in Collision Cases, 36 La. L. Rev. 288,
294 (1975); Note, Admiralty-Apportionment of Property Damages Arising from Maritime
Collision or Stranding-Supreme Court Abandons the Divided Damages Rule, 50 Tul. L. Rev.
148, 152-53 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Apportionment of Property Damages]; Note,
Admiralty, Damages in Maritime Collision or Stranding, 8 Va. J. Int'l L. 881 (1975). See also
Ancient Mariner, supra note 20, at 88.
120. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 406 (1975). The Court stated,
"The Court has long implicitly recognized the patent harshness of an equal division of dam-
ages in the face of disparate blame by applying the 'major-minor' fault doctrine to find a
grossly negligent party solely at fault." Id.
[Vol. 1
MARITIME COLLISION LAW
and comparative negligence was noted by the Second Circuit in
Getty Oil Co. v. S. S. Ponce de Leon,' and the doctrine was there
rejected.
With regard to the Pennsylvania Rule, it has been argued that
it should survive the switch to proportional division because its
purpose is to promote safety in navigation by demanding strict com-
pliance with the rules. Nonetheless, as the Court in Reliable noted,
comparative negligence in itself should act as a sufficient deterrent
of careless conduct.1 2 The question then becomes one of determin-
ing whether such a rule serves any useful purpose under a system
of comparative fault. The Ninth Circuit, in deciding that the
Pennsylvania Rule should not be used against a Japanese vessel
covered by the Brussels Convention, concluded that the rule was
justified where damages were equally divided because it simplified
the adjudication of collision cases. 123 However, no such purpose was
found to be served by its use in conjunction with comparative negli-
gence:
To utilize the Pennsylvania Rule in conjunction with the Japanese
system does nothing to simplify adjudication and, because of the
difficulty in comparing the failure to discharge a frequently impos-
sible burden with the fault of a different character of the other
party to a collision, may frustrate the ends of the Japanese system
by necessitating the resort to the arbitrary result that an equal
division of damages provides.'
2 '
Additionally, it should be noted that the Pennsylvania Rule,
unlike other presumptions, does more than shift the burden of going
forward with the evidence to the party in violation of the statute. It
essentially shifts the burden of proving causation from the party
121. 555 F.2d 328, 333 (2d Cir. 1977).
122. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 405 (1975). The Court stated,
It is difficult to imagine any manner in which the divided damages rule would be
more likely to "induce care and vigilance" than a comparative rule that also penal-
izes wrongdoing, but in proportion to measure of fault. A rule that divided damages
by degree of fault would seem better designed to induce care than the rule of equally
divided damages, because it imposes the strongest deterrent upon the wrongful
behavior that is most likely to harm others.
Id. n.ll.
123. Ishizaki Kisen Co. v. United States, 510 F.2d 875, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1975). Of cases
subsequent to United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975), that have been
governed by comparative negligence, all have applied the Pennsylvania Rule without ques-
tioning its validity under a system of comparative fault. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. O/S East
Point, 421 F. Supp. 48, 52-53 (W.D. Wash. 1976); Linehan v. United States Lines, Inc., 417
F. Supp. 678, 693 (D. Del. 1976); Alamo Chemical Transp. Co. v. M/V Overseas Valdes, 398
F. Supp. 1094, 1106 (E.D. La. 1975).
124. Ishizaki Kisen Co. v. United States, 510 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1975).
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alleging negligence to the party who has violated the statute. Under
a system of comparative negligence, the more satisfactory approach
is to treat the violation of a statute as a fault to compare with the
negligence of the other party. Whether or not the violation caused
the collision should be determined by applying ordinary rules of
causation and the emphasis in porportional division should be
placed on the degree of fault rather than causal relationships.
Further, it should be noted that the Brussels Convention abol-
ished all legal presumptions of fault in collisions." 5 An early inter-
pretation of the Brussels Convention, as it was submitted to the
United States Senate, suggested that the legal presumption provi-
sion was inaccurately translated and was intended to apply only to
statutory legal presumptions. 2 If such is the case, the Pennsylvania
Rule would not be eliminated, since it is a judicial presumption.
27
This argument is based on the conclusion that the Brussels Conven-
tion, written in French, in effect adopted the civil law definition of
a legal presumption which includes only those set forth in stat-
utes. 28 However, it is questionable whether countries signing an
international agreement would intend to be bound solely by a civil
law definition that could only be determined by resort to sources
outside the actual document.129 In addition, such an approach would
result in an inconsistent interpretation of the article governing pre-
sumptions, since presumptions in some nations may be contained
in statutes, while in others they may be found in judicial deci-
sions. ,3
125. 6 Benedict, supra note 50, at 40: "There shall be no legal presumptions of fault in
regard to liability for collision."
126. 4 Benedict on Admiralty 262-69 (6th ed. A. Knauth 1940) [hereinafter cited as
Benedict 6th ed.]. Benedict claims that the English translation is too loose and that it should
read "statutory presumptions of fault." This stricter reading is required by the definition of
"legal presumption" in the Code Napoleon which states that "a legal presumption is one
which is affixed by a special statute to certain acts or to certain facts." Id. The Supreme Court
has noted that the Brussels Collision Convention failed to win Senate approval because,
among other things, it was poorly translated. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S.
397, 409 n.14 (1975).
127. There is only one statutory legal presumption in American collision law. The
Stand-by Act provides that a ship that fails to stand by after a collision is presumed to be
responsible for the collision. 33 U.S.C. § 367 (1970). Benedict suggests that this is the only
presumption that would be abolished by the Brussels Collision Convention. 4 Benedict 6th
ed., supra note 126, at 264.
128. 4 Benedict 6th ed., supra note 126, at 263.
129. The conference was attended by delegations from Belgium, Brazil, Denmark,
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain & Northern Ireland, Greece, Spain,
Italy, Monaco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. 6 Benedict, supra
note 50, at 34.
130. Ishizaki Kisen Co. v. United States, 510 F.2d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 1975).
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There may be fewer problems posed by the question of the
survival of the in extremis defense than those found in relation to
the Pennsylvania Rule. In extremis operates as a complete defense,
and it is in essence a denial of fault.13' Since damages cannot be
assessed against a vessel except where fault exists it would seem
that in extremis would be effective to relieve a vessel of all responsi-
bility,' 3 even under a comparative negligence system.
The same reasoning is applicable to a collision that is the result
of inevitable accident. A vessel claiming that the collision occurred
despite the taking of all reasonable precautions under the circum-
stances is in reality contending that it was not at fault and did not
contribute to the collision.'3 If such were successfully proved, the
vessel should not be held responsible in any degree. Accordingly, the
Brussels Convention requires that damages be borne by the party
who has suffered them where the collision is caused by an act of God
or is otherwise accidental.'
3'
Damages are not apportioned under the Convention in cases of
inscrutable fault in which a determination of fault cannot be made
because the evidence is confusing.' This situation should also sur-
vive the adoption of comparative negligence in the United States.
Apportionment cannot occur where the proof is not sufficiently clear
as to what act or failure to act caused the collision.3  This provision
should be distinguished from the Supreme Court's holding in
Reliable that the damages are to be divided when it is not possible
to establish the degree of the respective faults. In the former fault
131. Mole & Wilson, supra note 37, at 352.
132. Id. Contra, Apportionment of Property Damages, supra note 119, at 152. Arkansas
has approved the similar concept of "emergency" as a complete defense to liability under its
tort comparative negligence system. Johnson v. Nelson, 242 Ark. 10, 411 S.W.2d 661 (1967).
The application of in extremis was approved after the switch to comparative fault in Linehan
v. United States Lines, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 678, 693 (D. Del. 1976).
133. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-2 at 486-87.
134. 6 Benedict, supra note 50, at 39. The provision is as follows: "If the collision is
accidental, if it is caused by force majeure . . . the damages shall be borne by those who
have suffered them." Id. For a history of the English Rule 42, see The English and Empire
Digest §§ 6900-6950 (1965).
135. 6 Benedict, supra note 50, at 39: "[11f the causes of the collision are in doubt,
the damages shall be borne by those who have suffered them." See Apportionment of Prop-
erty Damages, supra note 119, at 153.
136. G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra note 1, § 7-2 at 486-87; Mole & Wilson, supra note
37, at 345. Lord Sumner, in construing the Brussels Convention, stated,
The conclusion that it is possible to establish different degrees of fault must be a
conclusion proved by evidence, judicially arrived at, and sufficiently made out.
Conjecture will not do: a general leaning in favour of one ship rather than of the
other will not do: sympathy for one of the wrongdoers, too indefinite to be supported
by a reasoned judgment, will not do.
The Peter Benoit, 13 Asp. M.L.C. 203, 208 (1915).
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is known to exist, but the exact roles the parties played in causing
the collision are unclear because of failure of proof. In the latter,
however, the court is able to attribute fault to the parties but unable
to make a mathematical determination assigning the amount of
fault to the respective vessels involved.
Conclusion
The history of maritime law has seen the development of essen-
tially local regulations into uniform codes that cover diverse situa-
tions and ships of all nationalities. With regard to the law of colli-
sions, it is easily seen that a vessel under the flag of the United
States is as likely to collide with a French ship as with one from her
own country. Accordingly, it is essential that all vessels be governed
by the same standards and potential liabilities. The United States
Supreme Court has taken an important step toward the requisite
uniformity by adopting comparative negligence in this area. 3' At
least, as far as damages are concerned, the major maritime nations
of the world are basically in accord. If, however, American courts
continue to use the Pennsylvania Rule because of its admittedly
laudable purpose, they will be irrationally clinging to a legal fiction
at the expense of much needed uniformity in maritime law. It is to
be hoped that the courts will interpret Reliable as giving its ap-
proval to the approach taken by the Brussels Convention and that
they will try to implement its provisions through holdings that are
consistent with it.
137. If the collision results in cargo damage, there will still be a consideration of the
forum in which suit should be brought. There will also be a considerable difference for
purposes of limitation of liability according to whether the United States Limitation of
Liability Act or the 1957 Brussels Limitation of Liability Convention is applied. Healy &
Koster, supra note 86, at 299-300. Compare 46 U.S.C. § § 181-188 with Convention, Limitation
of Liability, Oct. 10, 1957. See also 6A Benedict, supra note 50, at 637.
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